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The coup in Bamako, on 22 March 2012 both gave lie to the apparent stability of 
Mali as a democratic country and resulted in the taking of power of an assortment of 
armed combatants in the North of the country, which resulted in armed intervention by 
France. This article is about the coup itself that created the power vacuum allowing the 
insurrection to grow and ultimately take power in the North. The authors have developed 
a framework for analyzing civil – military relations they believe is more useful than other 
available frameworks in understanding the role of the military in politics.
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1. iNTrODUCTiON
In this article we build on the 
conceptual framework of Samuel E. 
Finer in The Man on Horseback: The 
Role of the Military in Politics, and 
use the case study of the North West 
African country of Mali. We believe 
that any analysis of democratic civil 
– military relations must be attuned, 
as Finer’s book so convincingly 
demonstrates, to the potential for 
a military coup to overthrow a 
democratic regime [1]. While there 
may be some areas of social science 
in which conceptualization has minor 
implications, civil – military relations 
is not one of them since, at least in our 
formulation, how civilian decision-
makers deal with the armed forces, 
and other security institutions, can, 
as in the case of Mali, result in very 
serious consequences.  We realize that 
the case of Mali may be particularly 
dramatic given the long history of 
insurgents in the North of the country 
and the fact that the demands on the 
armed forces for fighting insurgents 
seriously increased after the collapse 
of the Muammar el-Qaddafi regime 
in Libya in August 2011 [2]. Even so, 
we believe that sooner or later most 
armed forces will be required to do 
something concrete by the civilian 
leaders and, if the requirements we 
posit for control and effectiveness are 
not fulfilled, the democratic regime 
may well be overthrown [3].
2. THE MiLiTArY COUP iN MALi
2.1. background on the Coup
Mali gained independence from 
France in 1960, and became a one-
party socialist style dictatorship 
under President Modibo Kéïta until 12
1968, when a military coup led by 
Moussa Traoré removed Kéïta from 
power. Traoré remained President 
until 1991, when Amadou Toumani 
Touré (dubbed ATT) – an army officer 
- staged a coup that overthrew Traoré 
[4]. Since then, according to all 
surveys or sources we have consulted, 
Mali was one of the few democracies 
in Africa, which everybody in the 
international arena praised [5]. In 
this regard, in 2011 (and even in 2012), 
the widely respected Freedom House 
listed Mali as one of five democracies 
in Africa [6].    Not only did Freedom 
House list Mali as “free” in terms of 
freedom of political rights and civil 
liberties but it also listed it as “free” in 
terms of freedom of the press, a status 
many older as well as Second and Third 
Wave democracies in Europe and Latin 
America still lack [7].    
 All of this came to a quick and 
violent end with the military coup on 
March 22, 2012, a few weeks before 
the democratic elections scheduled for 
April, when Touré would follow his 
predecessor’s example and step down 
at the end of his two constitutionally 
permitted terms [8].  On March 22, a 
group  of  junior  officers  and  enlisted 
soldiers, led by Army Captain Amadou 
Haya Sanogo, overthrew the elected 
government of Touré, looted the 
presidential palace, seized members 
of the government, suspended the 
Constitution, imposed a curfew, and 
closed the country’s borders [9]. 
The coup was followed by 
instability and violence in the capital 
of Bamako, and quickly in the loss 
of Malian government control in the 
Northern half of the country (including 
the well-known tourist destination of 
Timbuktu) to an array of four major 
insurgent groups, which had long been 
operating in the North of Mali but 
which consolidated their power after 
the fall of the dictatorship in Libya 
(the groups will be discussed later 
in this paper). Dioncounda Traoré, 
then 70 years old, was appointed 
interim head of government until 
July 31, 2012, when new elections 
were to be held.  The interim 
government has been challenged by 
the existence of conflicting internal 
divisions, continuous military 
meddling in politics, corruption 
and mismanagement within state 
institutions, as well as harsh economic 
constraints due to a national recession 
and revenue crisis [10]. The transition 
was delayed due to Traore’s health 
problems after he was beaten by 
loyalists of Captain Sanogo.  On August 
20, 2012, a new government was 
announced, within which many ministers 
were considered close to the coup leader 
(with some reports emphasizing they 
were actually selected by the military) 
while none of the ministers had ties 
to ATT [11]. On December 11, 2012, 
under arrest, Mali Prime Minister Cheick 
Modibo Diarra announced his resignation 
and the resignation of his government. A 
new Prime Minister Django Sissoko was 
appointed [12]. In May 2013, the interim 
government announced that general 
elections would be held on July 28, 2013. 
2.2. The rebels
The main groups competing, or 
at times cooperating, for power in the 
disrupted context of “pre-“ and “post”coup 
Mali are the following [13]:
1) The  Azawad  National 
Liberation Movement (MNLA), 
which was created in 2011 from the 
merger of existing Tuareg groups 
(including those who went to Libya 
during the Qaddafi rule and came back 
after the collapse of his dictatorship), 
is a secular revolutionary movement 
fighting for establishing a pan-ethnic 
independent state in Azawad. While 
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MNLA allied with Ansar Dine and 
MUJAO (to be discussed below) 
initially, it now opposes Islamic 
jihadist groups. On April 6, 2012, 
the MNLA declared independence 
from Mali with the creation of the 
Republic of “Azawad” in three 
Northern counties. Despite attempts 
to seek legitimacy for Azawad’s 
independence by invoking United 
Nations charter and separatist 
aspirations going back to 1958, two 
years before Mali’s independence from 
France, no foreign government has so 
far recognized Azawad [14]. 
2) Ansar Dine, also known as 
Ansar al Deen, Ansar Eddin or Ansar 
al Dine,  (“Defenders of the religion” 
in Arabic), which was established in 
2011with the goal to impose the Shari’a 
across the whole country (yet without 
disputing Mali’s territorial integrity).  
3) Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM) is the former 
Algerian salafist Group for Preaching 
and Combat (GSPC), renamed in 
2007, after the group officially joined 
Al-Qa’ida central in 2006. AQIM 
was established in the North of Mali 
without encountering any opposition 
from the Malian government, and 
includes combatants of Algerian, 
Mauritanian, Senegalese and Malian 
nationalities, loyal to Osama Bin 
Laden’s legacy [15]. AQIM uses 
ransom money from kidnapping of 
Western citizens as well as drug-
trafficking to fund itself. 
4)  The Movement for Unity and 
Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), which 
emerged in 2011 from combatants 
who defected from AQIM,  due to 
“the marginalization of black African 
members” within AQIM [16]. 
In 2012-2013, two more groups 
emerged from the previously 
discussed four. 
5) Signed-in-Blood  Battalion 
(also known as the Signatories for Blood) 
is an AQIM breakaway faction supporting 
global jihad, created in 2012 [17]. 
6)  Islamic Movement for Azawad 
(IMA): is a movement is an Ansar 
Dine breakaway faction created in 
January 2013, after France commenced 
military intervention in Mali [18]. IMA 
expressed its willingness to negotiate 
for a peaceful settlement of the crisis in 
Mali, as well as their readiness to fight 
“extremism” and “terrorism” [19].
The Tuareg groups had been 
operating in the North and rebelling 
against the Malian State since the 
early 1950s (more frequently since 
the 1990s). Such rebellions led to the 
adoption of several peace accords 
including the National Pact of 1992, 
and the Algiers Accord of 2006 [20]. 
Nevertheless, lack of implementation 
of said accords only increased the 
Tuareg grievances. As David J. 
Francis notes, “Between 1985 and 
2009 the government signed several 
peace deals and ceasefire agreements 
after every violent Tuareg rebellion, 
without addressing on a long-term 
basis the fundamental problems of 
the marginalisation and exclusion of 
the Tuareg minority. The promises 
by successive governments of 
greater political autonomy and 
devolved rule for the Tuaregs in 
the north never materialised.” [21] 
What distinguished the January 2012 
context from previous rebellions, 
however, was the strong Islamist vibe 
in the traditionally nationalist Tuareg 
groups, which, coupled with the fall 
of  the  Qaddafi  regime  in  Libya  in 
2011, helped the rebels consolidate 
their power in North Mali. As 
Mireille Affa’a-Mindzie argues, 
“Groups like Ansar Dine (Defenders 
of Faith) had ties to ideologically 
motivated external groups such as 
Algeria-based al-Qaida in the Islamic 14
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Maghreb (AQIM). Added to that was 
the proliferation of heavy weapons after 
the downfall of Libyan leader Qaddafi, 
making for a volatile situation.” [22]
2.3. Foreign intervention
Clearly, since the coup to early 
January 2013 the unstable political 
situation in Bamako coupled with 
the alliances between the Tuareg and 
Islamist groups paved the way for the 
rebels to advance and seize the main 
Northern Mali cities - Timbuktu, Gao 
and Kidal, then central Mali city of 
Konna – threatening to advance all 
the way to Bamako [23]. Originally 
a UN – sponsored military force was 
planned to fight the various insurgents 
in order to retake the North of Mali.   
ECOWAS, African Union, as well 
as other partners, agreed in the fall 
of 2012 to an intervention plan for 
retaking the North. The plan involved 
3000 troops provided by Mali, 3000 
by ECOWAS, intelligence and 
logistics support, as well as aerial 
cover and surveillance by France and 
UN, and training of Malian troops 
by the EU [24]. However, while the 
international military intervention to 
combat militants and retake the North 
was planned to take place in the Fall 
of 2013, the advancement to central 
Mali and possible capture of Bamako, 
which would have had a deleterious 
impact on not only Mali, but also 
on the whole region, prompted the 
Malian president to seek military 
assistance from France in January 
2013. France, also concerned with 
the impact that a rebel-dominated 
Mali have on the region and beyond, 
but which has its particular interests 
in Mali (given the high number of 
French citizens living or traveling to 
and from Mali, as well as of various 
business and economic ties with Mali 
and the region) began air attacks on 
the insurgents on January 11 (under 
the name of Operation “Serval”) as 
they were moving South and were 
feared to capture the capital, Bamako, 
if outside military assistance was not 
quickly provided [25]. French troops 
were joined by an ECOWAS-led 
led force in late January, while the 
European Union started in March 
to provide training to the Malian 
armed forces to help them boost their 
effectiveness [26]. The operation was 
approved unanimously by the UN 
Security Council, which underscores 
the shared international concern 
about the mounting extremism and 
armed  conflict  in  Mali.  since  the 
launch of the operation, ECOWAS-
led African-led International Support 
Mission to Mali (AFISMA) troops 
(e.g. French, Mali, Chad, etc.) have 
recaptured important territories in the 
North of Mali, including Timbuktu, 
Gao, and Kidal, took prisoners, and 
killed several hundred, including 
important Al Qaeda leaders such as 
Abdelhamid Abou Zeid, one of the 
top ranking Sahara commanders 
of Al Qaeda in North Africa [27]. 
Despite these accomplishments, 
Islamists “melted back into desert 
and mountain hideaways and 
have begun a small campaign of 
harassment and terror, dispatching 
suicide bombers, attacking guard 
posts, infiltrating liberated cities or 
ordering attacks by militants hidden 
among civilians.”[28] In addition, 
the rebels conducted terrorist attacks.   
In sum, while one could argue that 
the intervention has been successful 
in pushing the rebels away from the 
main Mali cities, one still cannot 
assess its further impact on Mali’s 
future and / or return to democracy. 
The international community 
acknowledges that a solution to 
the situation in Mali requires a Journal of Defense Resources Management  Vol. 5, Issue 1 (8) /2014
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multipronged approach by Mali, 
as well as its regional and global 
partners and allies: diplomatic, 
political, humanitarian, economic, 
and security (including the problem 
of counterinsurgency)[29].  
All of these developments made 
France consider an incremental 
withdrawal of its troops and 
AFISMA’s  replacement with a UN 
Force.  In March 2013, the U.N. 
Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon 
stated: “Our worry is that [the 
jihadists] could reappear, and that 
could affect the countries of the 
region.”[30]  On April 25, 2013, the 
United Nations Security Council 
unanimously adopted Resolution 
2100 of 2013, which established 
the Peacekeeping Force for Mali 
(United Nations Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission 
(MINUSMA), to replace AFISMA, 
effective July1, 2013. Extremely 
significant, MINUSMA will 
operate under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, and will be comprised 
of some 11,200 troops, 1,440 
police, to replace AFISMA [31].
The initial vacuum in power 
created by the coup, which is 
highlighted above, was extremely 
important in allowing the situation 
described above to happen. As the 
very highly – regarded North Africa 
expert, Roland Marchal stated: 
“As expected, [by him in an earlier 
publication] the coup in Bamako 
on March 22nd 2012 was more 
a symptom of the crisis in Mali 
than  the  first  step  to  its  recovery. 
The crisis actually deepened and 
was reshaped by new dynamics, 
including the growing role of jihadi 
groups such as al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the 
Movement for Unicity (Tawhid) and 
Justice in West Africa (MUJWA).” 
[32]  Equally important, and 
currently receiving increasing 
attention in serious scholarly work, 
are the reverberations from the coup 
in three major areas. First, the need 
for a legitimate government to take 
control over the armed forces, which 
of course made the coup and are still 
to some degree involved in power, 
in order for them to become more 
professionally competent to be able 
to work with the French and other 
African armed forces, to include 
Chad, Nigeria, Niger among others, 
and to do so in a way that respects 
human rights. Free and fair elections, 
in particular elections that the North 
will perceive as credible, are the 
first step to ensure this. second, to 
establish a government that is able to 
reengage with the United States, and 
thereby receive military and other 
aid beyond solely humanitarian 
assistance, which was cut off after 
the coup [33]. And, third, the need 
to establish a government that can 
in fact negotiate with the various 
groups in the North, and especially 
the Tuaregs with the goal to establish 
a workable and long term “solution” 
to the problems of decentralization 
or recognition of different ethnic 
groups [34].  In short, the coup has 
had very serious and continuing 
negative repercussions. 
Currently, as Wolfram Lacher 
and Denis M. Tull argue, “it is still 
unclear what impact the French 
intervention will have on the balance 
of power in Bamako. France, 
AFISMA and EUTM Mali will seek 
to curb the coup leaders’ influence. 
However, even if they are successful, 
the army leadership will attempt to 
capitalise on the fact that external 
actors depend on cooperation with the 
Malian army for their intervention in 
the north.” [35]16
THE MILITARY COUP IN MALI, 22 MARCH 2012. REFLECTIONS ON THE DEMISE OF DEMOCRACY 
AND THE IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL – MILITARY RELATIONS
3. ANALYSiS OF THE COUP 
UTiLiZiNG SAMUEL FiNEr’S 
FrAMEwOrk
 
In a country like Mali, where the 
democratic system was problematic 
even before the coup, we strongly 
identify with the following statement 
by Samuel E. Finer.  “Instead of asking 
why the military engage in politics, 
we ought surely ask why they ever 
do  otherwise.  For  at  first  sight  the 
political advantages of the military 
vis-à-vis other and civilian groupings 
are overwhelming. The military possess 
vastly superior organization. And they 
possess arms.” [36] If we employ Finer’s 
framework for analysis we find that the 
military had, in Finer’s terms, both the 
mood and disposition to intervene. For 
Finer the mood can consist of self – 
awareness, overwhelming power, and 
grievance.  The opportunity is most 
likely created when a civilian regime 
must increasingly rely on the military.  
In our own work on civil – military 
relations, which we developed for 
more consolidated democracies, we 
have elaborated on Finer’s framework 
by conceptualizing civil-military 
relations in terms of both democratic 
civilian control and military 
effectiveness.  specifically in terms 
of Mali, we believe there is sufficient 
evidence to conclude that the catalyst 
for the coup on 22 March 2012, and 
the support it quickly received from 
broad sectors of the armed forces, 
can only be understood in terms of 
the perception of the armed forces, 
which was largely accurate, that 
the government was not providing 
them with the necessary means to 
be effective in military terms. This 
was the oft-repeated allegation of the 
coup leader, Captain Amadou Haya 
Sanogo, who, together with other coup 
leaders publicly stated that they were 
frustrated with the lack of effective 
management of the defense sector 
by Mali’s government (especially 
when attempting to confront the 
rebellion in the North) [37]. Coup 
leaders lamented the unwillingness 
of the Ministry of Defense to 
provide weapons and other supplies 
(including food) to soldiers fighting 
the Tuaregs in the North, and the 
Minister’s refusal to respond to the 
subsequent rank-and-file complaints 
that they were not properly equipped 
to  fight  the  rebels  [38].  Indeed,  as 
the CRS report notes, “rebel gains, 
combined with mismanagement and 
corruption within the senior command 
… demoralized many Malian troops 
and undermined support for President 
Touré…Military commanders’ failure 
to protect troops from the massacre, 
which some analysts saw as having 
AQIM involvement, entrenched 
grievances within the ranks and among 
military families.”[39]  This analysis 
is also supported by what we saw 
“on the ground”, through participant 
observation and interviews, during 
two one week visits, in July 2010 
and September 2011. By the time of 
the second seminar, after the fall of 
Muammar  el-Qaddafi  and  decrease 
of foreign tourism to Mali by 90% 
due to the precarious security 
situation in the North, the Malian 
officers in the seminar made it clear 
they were very concerned about 
their ability to respond to security 
problems. In short, civilian control 
was jeopardized, or negated, by the 
inability or unwillingness of the Mali 
government to provide the armed 
forces with the means they required 
in order to be effective.   While 
we consider these observations 
unexceptional, and drawing directly 
from Finer’s work, we find we must 
expand on why we use this broader Journal of Defense Resources Management  Vol. 5, Issue 1 (8) /2014
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framework for analysis of civil – 
military relations. 
 
3.1. A Myopic Approach to 
Democracy and to Civil – Military 
relations
  Our observation above on 
the cause of the coup should be 
obvious, but it is not since civil – 
military relations has come to be 
conceptualized only in terms of 
democratic civilian control. That is, 
if there is any consideration at all to 
the security or military dimension, as 
most studies of democratization do 
not even include the security forces. 
And, when academics do include the 
military, it is exclusively in terms of 
democratic civilian control.  As Peter 
Feaver states in his 1999 review 
article: “Although civil – military 
relations is a very broad subject, 
encompassing the entire range of 
relationships between the military 
and civilian society at every level, 
the  field  largely  focuses  on  the 
control or direction of the military 
by the highest civilian authorities in 
nations states.” [40] This observation 
is further buttressed by the scholarly 
literature on new democracies, where 
the exclusive focus is asserting 
democratic civilian control [41]. 
While there are understandable 
historical reasons for the 
conceptualization of civil-military 
relations as exclusively asserting, and 
consolidating, democratic civilian 
control, it cannot accommodate what 
is happening in the “real world” 
of the relationships of the civilian 
policy – makers with the armed 
forces.  We thus propose a broader, 
and we believe, more relevant 
framework for the conceptualization.   
This conceptualization emphasizes 
two main themes. First, the need 
for developing institutions for both 
control and effectiveness; and, 
second, a focus on the necessary 
but  not  sufficient  requirements  for 
both.  Here we encounter, at least 
for civilian decision- makers, the 
challenges of adopting a more 
relevant framework.  To create 
institutions, requires attention and 
effort, and the payoff in terms of 
votes generally appears problematic. 
Further, in our framework, to achieve 
effectiveness requires not only a plan, 
or strategy, but also institutions to 
cooperate with the armed forces and 
other security forces, and resources 
in the form of money and personnel.   
These are very demanding, and few 
political leaders are willing to make 
the types of commitment necessary. 
Our argument is: if scholars and 
decision – makers would begin to 
think in terms of this framework, 
they can better deal with the myriad 
of challenges and issues that arise 
between civilian decision makers 
and the security forces, to include 
armed forces, national police, and 
intelligence services [42].
  Democratic civilian control of 
the armed forces must indeed remain 
a central part of the civil-military 
relations framework, especially with 
regard to new democracies, and most 
importantly those that emerge from 
military dictatorships. Nevertheless, 
it is not sufficient to describe civil-
military relations in the twenty first 
century in terms of control alone, 
and Mali is a case in point, and even 
more so, judging from the country’s 
history, as civilian control was 
precarious.   From the perspective of 
making effective security decisions 
and policies, which requires 
“functioning” security forces, civil-
military relations must involve more 
than control. In a democracy, policy 18
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makers craft and implement security 
decisions and policies that are in 
service of safeguarding democratic 
values, national interests, and the 
citizens themselves; successful 
policies, however, go hand in hand 
with effective security forces. We 
must remember that even when 
civilian control is unquestioned, as 
in the United States, this control by 
itself is no guarantee that the policy-
makers will make good decisions, or 
implement policy in such a way as 
to result in military success. On the 
other hand, the exclusive focus on 
the military versus the other security 
forces is detrimental to understanding 
the larger and more complex 
relationships concerning democracy 
and security forces, particularly 
when we consider the very wide 
spectrum of interchangeable roles 
and missions. The concept should, 
then, include the effectiveness of all 
security forces in doing their jobs, at 
the optimum cost possible – that is, 
efficiently. 
4. CONCLUSiON
Beginning with the military coup 
in Mali that has huge implications 
for regional and, as evidenced by 
the French military intervention on 
January 11, 2013 and the UN Security 
Council decision under Chapter 
VII on 25 April 2013, international 
security, we argue that a, if not 
the, cause is a poorly understood 
approach to civil-military relations 
that focuses exclusively on 
democratic civilian control. While 
understandable, we argue that this 
focus  is  insufficient  and  must  be 
balanced and be combined with 
equal attention to what is required 
for armed forces to be effective.  
NOTE ON SOUrCES
The literature on civil – military 
relations in Africa is limited. In this 
article on Mali there are three main 
reasons why, we believe, we have 
adequate information to be able to 
describe and analyze reasonably 
accurately. First, the co-authors 
spent one week in July 2010 and 
another week in September 2011 
in Bamako, Mali, conducting 
seminars on intelligence reform 
for intelligence professionals from 
several Francophone countries in 
North Africa. We used the seminars 
as a form of participant observations, 
and beyond the seminars conducted 
interviews with local Malian 
civilians and civilian and military 
officials at the U.s. embassy. second, 
due to the coup of 22 March 2012, 
and  the  subsequent  conflict  in  the 
North involving a wide ideological 
spectrum of combatants, with the 
resultant armed combat involving at 
least France from 11 January 2013, 
there is a great deal of attention 
given to Mali.  There is periodic and 
extremely good reporting in the New 
York Times, originally by Adam 
Nossiter, who was based in Bamako 
and has been willing to communicate 
with the authors, as well as in The 
Washington Post, The Economist, 
and British Broadcasting Corporation 
(BBC) News. A very wide variety of 
think tanks and non-governmental 
organizations throughout Europe 
and North America have reported 
extensively on the situation in Mali. 
In particular we found the “Mali: 
Eviter L’Escalade. Rapport Afrique 
No 189-18 juillet 2012” very useful. 
We can also cite “Mali: Civilians 
Bear the Brunt of the Conflict” and Journal of Defense Resources Management  Vol. 5, Issue 1 (8) /2014
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Mali: Five Months of Crisis. Armed 
Rebellion and Military Coup by 
Amnesty International, London, 
2012; “ECOWAS in Face of the 
Crises in Mali and Guinea-Bissau: 
A Double-Standard Dilemma?” 
from IPRIS in Lisbon, August 2012; 
Anouar Boukhars, “The Paranoid 
Neighbor: Algeria  and  the  Conflict 
in Mali” Carnegie Endowment. The 
Carnegie Papers, October 2012; and, 
as can be seen in the endnotes, various 
articles from FRIDE, Norwegian 
Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 
London Review of Books, European 
Union Institute for Security Studies, 
and the U.S. Institute of Peace.  There 
are at least two governments interested 
in the situation as evidenced by the 
following two publications: Alexis 
Arieff and Kelly Johnson, “Crisis 
in Mali” Congressional Research 
Service Report for Congress 
(R42664) of 2012 and 2013, and 
Andrei Belik, Nela Grebovic and 
Jeff Willows, A Policy Briefing for 
Wayne G. Wouters, “Friction Along 
the Sahelian Fault Line: Azawad 
and  Ethnic  Conflict  in  Northern 
Mali” Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 
2012. Third, we capitalized on 
the information contained within 
the Defense Institution Reform 
Initiative papers, which are prepared 
and periodically updated by a team 
at the Center for Civil-Military 
Relations (CCMR) (including one 
of the authors of this article) for 
the Office of secretary of Defense, 
and which are based on a review 
of secondary source documents, 
as well as on discussions between 
CCMR experts and AFRICOM.  We 
used unpublished in depth research 
analyses on the Tuareg and Al Qaeda 
groups in the region written by 
CCMR colleague Lawrence E. Cline, 
former intelligence officer and expert 
in Islamically-based insurgencies, 
and José Olmeda, Dean of the 
Faculty of Political and Sociological 
Sciences at the Universidad Nacional 
de Educación a Distancia of Madrid.
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